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NCAA SCHOLARSHIP RESTRICTIONS AS
ANTICOMPETITIVE MEASURES:
THE ONE-YEAR RULE AND SCHOLARSHIP
CAPS AS AVENUES FOR ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
ABSTRACT
By referencing the historical record to expose the NCAA’s one-year
rule and per sport scholarship limits as cost-cutting, anticompetitive
measures imposing harmful effects upon scholarship-seeking studentathletes, this Note argues that despite the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana’s unfavorable ruling in Agnew v. NCAA,
a Sherman Act claim against the NCAA linking bachelor’s degrees and
scholarships could be legally viable. In particular, just application of the
quick look rule of reason, an abbreviated form of antitrust analysis, could
lead a court to find the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship
caps as violative of Section I of the Sherman Act. This follows from the
origins of the targeted scholarship rules in a horizontal agreement among
NCAA members informed by motives of crass commercialism, not the
romantic NCAA values of amateurism and the educated athlete. A court
mindful of this legacy, and possessing evidence of the anticompetitive
results that these rules have brought about, could fairly find the one-year
rule and per sport scholarship caps to be illegal restraints of trade meant
to boost NCAA member revenues at the expense of their student-athlete
consumers.
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INTRODUCTION
With the filing of his October 2010 class-action complaint against the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (the NCAA),1 Joseph Agnew
became the latest in a long line of disgruntled college athletes2 to seek
federal court remedies for alleged NCAA violations of Section I of the
Sherman Act.3 A former football player at Rice University, Agnew
brought his claim after Rice’s newly hired head football coach declined to
renew Agnew’s athletic scholarship4 in the summer before his senior
year.5 Such a move was well within the bounds of the NCAA’s bylaws,
which permit member institutions to revoke athletic scholarships at the
end of each school year without cause.6

1

Complaint at 1, Agnew v. NCAA, 2011 WL 3878200 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No.
10-4804). The complaint consistently cited in this Note is that which Agnew filed with
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in October of
2010. This complaint is distinct from the amended version Agnew brought against the
NCAA in March, 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana—the forum in which the case was ultimately decided. See infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
2
See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); In re NCAA
I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Gaines
v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1975). These cases represent only a sample of antitrust suits athletes have brought
against the NCAA since the 1970s.
3
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see also ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 16–20 (2010); discussion infra Part III.A.
4
The NCAA terms scholarships given to students in return for their athletic services
as “grants-in-aid.” Generally, these grants may cover the “actual cost of tuition and
required institutional fees,” but no more. NCAA, 2010–2011 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL:
CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS art. 15.2.1, at 196
(NCAA ed. 2010).
5
Katie Thomas, NCAA Sued Over One-Year Scholarships, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
2010, at B16. Agnew’s story is a fairly sympathetic one. A highly recruited defensive
back in high school, he accepted an athletic-scholarship offer from Rice University in
2006. After a promising freshman year, injuries limited his sophomore campaign. When
the coach who had recruited Agnew left after that season, Agnew found himself an injury-prone player under a new coach who was uninterested in his services. Although
Agnew won an appeal to retain his scholarship for his junior year, the new coaching staff
was successful in terminating his athletically-based aid the following summer.
6
NCAA bylaws allow member institutions to revoke athletic scholarships after the
end of each academic year without cause. Bylaw 15.3.5.1 details the extent of a school’s
obligation to its scholarship athletes:
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After assuming, therefore, the unanticipated cost of one year’s tuition
at Rice in order to earn his degree, Agnew turned to federal court for restitution, claiming in particular7 his victimization at the hands of the oneyear rule8 that defines the duration of all NCAA athletic scholarships.9
Asserting unlawful collusion by NCAA member institutions to create a
rule prohibiting schools from offering athletic scholarships on anything
other than a yearly basis, Agnew’s claim rested on the proposition that
such cooperation amounted to an illegal price-fixing scheme: an agreement to minimize members’ costs in competing for student-athletes by
mandating price maximization of the bachelor’s degrees those athletes
presumably seek.10 The one-year rule, in other words, by preventing opportunistic schools from driving up costs through competitively offering
The renewal of institutional financial aid based in any degree on athletics ability shall be made on or before July 1 prior to the academic year
in which it is to be effective. The institution shall promptly notify in
writing each student-athlete who received an award the previous academic year and who has eligibility remaining in the sport in which financial aid was awarded the previous academic year (under Bylaw
14.2) whether the grant has been renewed or not renewed for the ensuing academic year.
NCAA, supra note 4, art. 15.3.5.1, at 205; see also Sean M. Hanlon, Athletic Scholarships as Unconscionable Contracts of Adhesion: Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS
LAW. J. 41, 43–46 (2006) (describing the deceptive nature of the athletic-scholarship
“contract”).
7
Complaint at paras. 41–46, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804).
8
The principal portion of the “one-year rule” for grants-in-aid to which Agnew’s
complaint objects reads as follows: “If a student’s athletics ability is considered in any
degree in awarding financial aid, such aid shall neither be awarded for a period in excess
of one academic year nor for a period less than one academic year.” NCAA, supra note 4,
art. 15.3.3.1, at 203.
9
Although this Note will make its case primarily by citing information pertaining to
NCAA Division I athletics and the ways in which the member institutions of that division
interact, it is of note that NCAA Division II bylaws also mandate the renewal of athletic
scholarships on a yearly basis. NCAA, 2010–2011 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL:
CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS, ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS art. 15.3.3.1, at 154
(NCAA ed. 2010) [hereinafter “NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL”]. Meanwhile, member
institutions of NCAA Division III, the NCAA’s least athletically competitive division,
are not permitted to grant scholarships based on athletic talent. MURRAY SPERBER, BEER
AND CIRCUS: HOW BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE
EDUCATION 270–71 (2000). For further discussion of the NCAA’s organization of member institutions by athletic divisions, see infra note 69.
10
Complaint at paras. 1–4, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804); see also Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2011, at 6, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-collegesports
/8643/6/ (describing Agnew’s impetus for filing suit against the NCAA and the inquiries
of the United States Justice Department into the NCAA’s one-year scholarship rule).
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guaranteed four- or five-year athletic scholarships, instead had allegedly
helped NCAA members maximize revenues by retaining the possibility of
extracting tuition dollars from erstwhile scholarship athletes.
Finally, Agnew’s complaint alleged an additional source of illegal collusion by NCAA institutions11 via the NCAA’s mandated per sport scholarship limits.12 Agnew claimed that these NCAA-imposed caps on athletic scholarships for each NCAA sport supplemented the intent of the oneyear rule to reduce competition between, and thus costs for, NCAA members.13 Specifically, the complaint asserted that these caps would frustrate
competition14 by preventing ambitious athletic departments from offering
as many scholarships as they had roster spots available on a given team.15
The consequence, claimed Agnew, was to further increase the cost of a
bachelor’s degree for prospective student-athletes16 by forcing some to
“walk-on” to teams.17 Such walk-ons, without the benefit of an athletic
scholarship, would thus have to pay their school’s full tuition.18
Unfortunately for Agnew, when the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Indiana eventually resolved the issue,19 it showed
11

Complaint at para. 1, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804).
Although the NCAA permits both Division I and Division II institutions to offer
their student-athletes financial support via “grants-in-aid,” the number of grants per sport
permitted at Division I schools is considerably greater than that permitted at Division II
schools. For example, in one year a Division I Football Bowl Subdivision team may grant
up to eighty-five “equivalencies” (full grants-in-aid), while a Division II football team
may apportion amongst its players only thirty-six equivalencies. Compare NCAA, supra
note 4, art. 15.5.6.1, at 210, with NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL, supra note 9, art.
15.5.2.1.1, at 156.
13
Complaint at paras. 4, 28, 64, 67, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No.
10-4804).
14
Id. at para. 64.
15
For example, while a Division I Football Bowl Subdivision team has eighty-five
athletic-scholarships at its disposal, it may carry up to one hundred and five practicing
participants by the start of the regular season. NCAA, art. 17.9.2.1.2.1, at 262.
16
Complaint at paras. 48–49, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804).
17
Although Agnew’s complaint does not specifically use the phrase “walk-on,” his
complaint actually refers to the fate of walk-ons. For clarification of walk-ons in college
sports, and for an example of a similar price-fixing claim that walk-ons have brought, see
Complaint at paras. 7–8, In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. Ct. Pleadings 1650 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 12, 2004).
18
Complaint at para. 48, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804).
19
The NCAA succeeded, via a Motion to Transfer, in changing the case’s venue from
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. See Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at *3 (S.D.
Ind. Sept. 1, 2011).
12
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little sympathy for his position.20 Citing Seventh Circuit precedent, the
court declared the necessity of defining a relevant market in response to
any antitrust claim against the NCAA, and in turn dismissed the complaint
on the pleadings by concluding that Agnew’s asserted market for bachelor’s degrees was not in fact a plausible market.21
Though mindful of the district court’s adverse response to Agnew’s
antitrust challenge, the goal of this Note is to determine whether a similar
claim could nonetheless be viable in a jurisdiction not bound by precedent
to grant the NCAA the benefit of the doubt. Admittedly, a pessimistic
response to this effort would be just; the recent Agnew decision was reflective of a history littered with failed attempts by plaintiff students to allege
NCAA violations of the Sherman Act in federal courts.22 In particular,
though courts have suggested that collusion among NCAA members to fix
the price and availability of the NCAA’s output, college sports, could
violate antitrust provisions,23 the courts have distinguished such “commercial” activity from the formation of NCAA rules that advance the “noncommercial” objectives of preserving amateurism, competitive balance,
and academic integrity.24 Those rules, of course, affect student-athletes,
who serve as necessary “inputs” for the NCAA’s product,25 and whom the
courts apparently wish to protect from such evils as the “cold commercialism” of the professional ranks.26 As a result, despite widespread recognition of the NCAA as a functioning cartel of revenue-seeking institutions,27
20

See id. at *23–30.
Id. at *12–13, 26–30. For a discussion of the role of definition of a relevant market
in antitrust analysis, see discussion infra Part III.A.2. This Note will contend that another
court reviewing a claim such as Agnew’s would not be obliged to define a relevant market, but could instead analyze the claim under the “quick look” rule of reason. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
22
Since the mid-1970s, plaintiffs have brought a great number of antitrust claims
against the NCAA before federal courts. See, e.g., WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE
CONDUCT: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 387–92 (1995). Only twice, however, have
these courts recognized NCAA violations of the Sherman Act, first in NCAA v. Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, and later in Law v. NCAA.
23
See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. 468 U.S. 85, 85 (1984).
24
Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time”
College Athletics: The Need to Shift From Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of
Amateurism to the Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1,
4 (2000); see also Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 96.
25
ARTHUR A. FLEISHER ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION:
A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 15 (1992).
26
Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 331–35 (2005).
27
See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 14; James V. Koch & Wilbert M. Leonard,
The NCAA: A Socio-Economic Analysis, 37 AM. J. OF ECON. & SOC. 225, 229 (1978).
21
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courts have largely deemed acceptable the NCAA’s collusive efforts to
create rules that “preserve” its noncommercial values.28 Further, courts
have assented to such rules even when, for example, the rules have served
to maximize NCAA profits at the expense of student-athletes’ economic
interests.29
Despite courts’ justifications for permitting the NCAA’s monopolistic
oversight of its student-athletes, the prospect of advancing a claim like
Agnew’s intrigues in that it would threaten neither amateurism nor academic integrity. This is due in large part to its focus on the market for
bachelor’s degrees, and thus its demand that the NCAA relax rules limiting student-athlete access to a form of in-kind compensation30 that does
not affect their amateur status.31 By describing college athletes as prospective students seeking a degree, and as consumers deserving of that degree
at a competitive price, a bachelor’s degree-based complaint would stand
against the NCAA cartel’s price fixing scheme without running afoul of
the values of “amateurism” and “academic integrity” that have derailed
past antitrust suits.
By referencing the historical record to expose the NCAA’s one-year
rule and per sport scholarship limits as cost-cutting,32 anticompetitive
measures imposing harmful effects upon scholarship-seeking studentathletes, this Note will argue that despite the ruling in Agnew, a Sherman
Act claim against the NCAA linking bachelor’s degrees and scholarships
could be legally viable. Parts I, II, and III will set a foundation by discussing respectively the evolution of the NCAA into a cartel, the existence of
athletic scholarship rules as a product of cartel behavior, and the federal
courts’ treatment of the NCAA cartel in the face of past antitrust chalKoch defines a “cartel” as “a group of independent firms attempting, via collusive
agreement, to behave as a collective monopoly.” Id. at 229. See generally Craig A.
Depken & Dennis P. Wilson, The Impact of Cartel Enforcement in NCAA Division I-A
Football, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS (John Fizel & Rodney Forts eds., 2004).
28
Matthew J. Mitten, University Price Competition for Elite Students and Athletes:
Illusions and Realities, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 59, 62–63 (1995).
29
See Nagy, supra note 26, at 331–35.
30
See MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: THE ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT VS.
THE UNIVERSITY 208 (1990) (noting that college athletes sell their talents as sports entertainers in exchange for athletic scholarships).
31
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 72 (explaining the NCAA’s rationale, upon association-wide institution of the athletic-scholarship in 1956, that an athlete remained a true
amateur if he received from his school only “commonly accepted educational expenses”).
32
See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE BOTTOM LINE: OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS ON
THE SPORTS BUSINESS 234 (2006) (observing that “[t]he NCAA gets in trouble [with the
courts] when its regulations are designed to reduce the costs of operating an athletic
program”).
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lenges. Part IV will explain how just application of the quick look rule of
reason, an abbreviated form of antitrust analysis, could lead a court to find
the NCAA’s one-year rule and per sport scholarship caps as violative of
Section I of the Sherman Act. Fundamentally, this Note will show the
targeted scholarship rules to be products of a horizontal agreement among
NCAA members informed by motives of crass commercialism, not the
romantic NCAA values of amateurism and the educated athlete. A court
mindful of this legacy, and possessing evidence of the anticompetitive
results that these rules have brought about, could fairly find the one-year
rule and per sport scholarship caps to be illegal restraints of trade33 meant
to boost NCAA member revenues at the expense of their student-athlete
consumers.
I. THE NCAA: INFORMAL ASSOCIATION TO BUSINESS-ORIENTED CARTEL
Article I of the NCAA Constitution, which offers an articulation of the
NCAA’s “basic purpose,” would not be supportive of an antitrust claim’s
implication that the NCAA concerns itself with commercially-focused
activities, much less the restraint of trade.34 It offers no mention of input
or output markets, and no discussion of revenues or the centrality of a
commercial agenda. It articulates instead the values of academics and
amateurism,35 the very principles federal courts have often cited in waving
away student plaintiffs’ claims of NCAA antitrust violations.36 Although
such principles are admirable, and while they may yet have a place in
informing NCAA policies and rules, they strike an odd contrast with a
statement on the NCAA’s website, under a heading of “Commercialism,”
which reads: “[T]he NCAA maintains that ‘amateur’ describes intercollegiate athletics participants, not the enterprise.”37 There appears to be, in
other words, a place in the NCAA reserved for “relationships with corpo-

33

See ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS
NUTSHELL 8–9 (1994) (defining “restraint of trade,” and discussing the point at
which an ordinary business transaction becomes a deleterious restraint of trade).
34
See, e.g., NCAA, supra note 4, art. 1.2, at 1.
35
Article 1.3.1 of the NCAA Constitution reads, in part: “A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a
clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.” Id.
art. 1.3.1, at 1.
36
See Nagy, supra note 26, at 334.
37
Commercialism, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCA
A/Issues/Commercialism/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
IN A
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rate entities” and “revenue-generating sports,”38 commercial elements that
are acceptable so long as their influence does not tarnish the amateur status of the students who play the games. In this way, the NCAA leads a
“schizophrenic existence,”39 negotiating on one hand a fourteen-year,
$10.8 billion contract with CBS and Time Warner to televise its Men’s
Basketball Tournament,40 and on the other claiming that the resulting
average yearly intake of $77 million will function entirely to support the
non-commercial goals of amateurism and academics.
To be sure, the NCAA’s origins did not involve the same overwhelmingly commercial orientation and savvy.41 With the passage of the twentieth century, however, the rise in popularity of college sports, especially
football and men’s basketball, saw the NCAA grow to become the managerial hub of the college sports business: a business-oriented cartel of
member institutions making rules as much in aid of economic interests as
the principles of amateurism and academic integrity.42
A. The NCAA Originally: Formation and the Amateur Ideal
The NCAA arose primarily as President Theodore Roosevelt’s response to the rising number of deaths and serious injuries in earlytwentieth century college football.43 Specifically, it was the President’s
admonition of certain Ivy League officials, whose football contests had
been responsible for eighteen deaths in 1905, which helped prompt the
creation of the NCAA the following year.44 The new association, however,
was not to have the enforcement and revenue-producing responsibilities
that it currently maintains.45 Rather, as reflective of Roosevelt’s concerns,
it was to function as a regulatory body for college football, and its specific
purpose was to develop and standardize rules of the game to stem the
38

Id.
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 240.
40
Curtis Eichelburger, NCAA Says Sports Revenue Growth Won’t Exceed Three Percent at Biggest Schools in U.S., BLOOMBERG, Dec. 29, 2010, available at http://www
.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-29/ncaa-says-sports-revenue-growth-won-t-exceed-3-atbiggest-schools-in-u-s-.html.
41
BYERS, supra note 22, at 37–38 (quoting President Roosevelt, saying of college
football: “It is first-class, healthful play, and is useful as such. But play is not business...”).
42
See generally ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 235–37.
43
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 38–39.
44
Id.
45
See Craig A. Depken & Dennis P. Wilson, Institutional Change in the NCAA and
Competitive Balance in Intercollegiate Football, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS
203–05 (John Fizel & Rodney Fort eds., 2004).
39
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alarming rise in casualties of its participants.46 In this way, the NCAA
became a loosely tied, voluntary association of a small number of schools
seeking to provide uniform on-field rules for a particularly dangerous
game.47 Accompanying this purpose, though, was a now familiar-sounding
principle, as declared by Roosevelt, that “no student shall represent a college or university in any intercollegiate game ... who has at any time received ... money, or any other consideration.”48 Whether NCAA member
schools at the time took to heart Roosevelt’s insistence on amateurism in
the college game is another story.49 Nonetheless, the principle had been
expressed, its association with the NCAA affirmed by the President’s
words, and its message made available for posterity to claim as part of the
NCAA’s legacy.
B. The NCAA Evolves: Centralization and Enforcement
Although college football, and thus the NCAA, grew dramatically
through the first four-and-a-half decades after the NCAA’s founding,50 the
NCAA’s influence over college sports, and over football in particular, did
not extend far beyond its occasional propagation of amateurism-informed
regulations regarding the eligibility and compensation of college athletes.51 Yet because the NCAA had no mechanism through which it could
enforce these rules, schools generally operated as they wished, particularly
regarding compensation; the schools devised and carried out whatever
compensatory means they preferred to attract talented athletes to their

46

Id.
See Depken & Wilson, supra note 27, at 226. It is of note that upon its founding,
the NCAA, made up primarily of faculty representatives from member schools, immediately developed additional regulations addressing issues such as athletes’ eligibility,
rules regarding transfers, and amateurism. It would not, however, adopt any mechanisms
to enforce these regulations for another forty-plus years. Nevertheless, Fleisher characterizes the NCAA’s development of these early regulations as an initial foray into the
cartelization, defined by restraints on student-athletes as “inputs,” that today defines its
behavior. FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 41–42.
48
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 40.
49
See id. at 40, 65. Byers notes, for example, that during the 1930s and early 1940s,
“it was not uncommon for an alumnus to adopt a local high school athlete and ‘put him
through college.’” Id. at 40, 65; see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 42.
50
Fleisher describes the period from 1920 to 1940 as college football’s “golden age,”
as the era “witnessed the expansion of college athletics from a small cottage industry into
a nationwide preoccupation.” FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 42.
51
See id. at 44–45.
47
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campuses.52 This changed, however, in the period from 1946 to 1953,
when initiatives on the part of the NCAA’s most influential members saw
the once loosely bound, voluntary association transform into an effective,
rules-wielding cartel.53
A new wave of rhetoric inspired this transition, espousing a renewed
concern for amateurism in college sports—the old stand-by principle of
the NCAA that college football had generally neglected to recognize
through much of its history.54 This concern arose with the return of America’s World War II veterans in 1945, a massive crop of potential studentathletes eager for college degrees in response to the implementation of the
G.I. Bill of Rights.55 What followed was a recruiting free-for-all, as ambitious athletic programs looking to insert themselves into the scene of topflight college football began offering whatever financial inducements they
could to incorporate the new talent into their programs.56
Responding principally to these aggressive and increasingly expensive
recruiting tactics was college football’s entrenched elite, particularly the
members of the tradition-rich Big Ten Conference.57 Trumpeting the values of amateurism, but likely more concerned with the escalating costs of
athlete recruitment,58 leaders from The Big Ten and several other prominent NCAA football conferences convened in 1946 to draft the “Principles
of Conduct of Intercollegiate Athletics” (the Principles).59 At the core of
this document was its emphasis on the “amateur ideal” of the college athlete, and thus a corresponding insistence that financial aid to athletic re52

See id. at 46. The NCAA was, by one account, “a singularly toothless organization
that contented itself with vague resolutions commending amateurism.” MURRAY
SPERBER, ONWARD TO VICTORY: THE CRISES THAT SHAPED COLLEGE SPORTS 171
(1998).
53
See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 46.
54
Id. at 42–46.
55
The G.I. Bill of Rights, providing “government funding for all former [military]
service personnel wishing to attend university,” inspired the enrollment in post-secondary
educational institutions of many Americans who would have otherwise never considered
attending college. See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 168.
56
See, e.g., id. at 169–70.
57
Id. at 171–73. Although the NCAA may have exhibited relatively “toothless” enforcement of its rules pertaining to recruitment and other matters, it encouraged, with
some success, regulation of such matters at the conference level. By the 1940s, college
football conferences, made up of athletically competitive schools independently organized by geographical region, functioned as relatively centralized entities with identifiable leadership able to exert an influence over their members that the NCAA could not.
See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 44–47; SPERBER, supra note 52, at 173–74.
58
See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 174.
59
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 47.

214

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:203

cruits be granted “on the basis of qualifications of which athletic ability is
not one.”60 The general consensus was that college athletes ought not to
receive in-kind payments to play sports.61 Two years later, those party to
the Principles’ construction used them to form the backbone of the revolutionary “Sanity Code” (the Code), an assemblage of rules on amateurism,
eligibility, and financial aid, coupled with an unprecedented mechanism to
enforce those rules,62 that NCAA membership voted into the NCAA constitution in 1948.63
Ultimately, the Sanity Code did not succeed in its mission to ensure
nationwide compliance with NCAA rules.64 This was largely due to the
Code’s extreme call for the expulsion of rules violators from the NCAA.
When a substantial number of schools immediately refused to abide by the
Code’s ban on athletic scholarships, the NCAA’s new enforcement arm
proved simply unwilling to mete out such a drastic and heavy-handed
punishment.65
Despite the Sanity Code’s failure, however, it nevertheless set a
precedent for cooperative action within the college football community to
create a centralized, enforcement-oriented NCAA, a model inspired considerably by the growing costs of fielding competitive college football
teams.66 It was this precedent that transformed understandings of the
NCAA’s potential, which thereby set the foundation for the full cartelization of the NCAA and a “new era of regulation” that would soon come to
pass.67

60

SPERBER, supra note 52, at 173–74.
Id. Fleisher describes the regulation, however, as one that simply “pushed all athletic scholarships through the regular financial aid routes,” thus eliminating athletic scholarships in name only. FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 47.
62
A Compliance Committee and a Fact-Finding Committee executed enforcement of
the Sanity Code; the former serving to evaluate alleged Code violations and dispense
punishment as necessary, and the latter functioning as the former’s investigative arm.
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 48. During the Sanity Code’s brief reign, most Code
infractions involved violations of its prohibition of athletic-scholarships, a prohibition
established in the name of amateurism. BYERS, supra note 22, at 67.
63
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 47.
64
Id. at 48.
65
SPERBER, supra note 52, at 240–41.
66
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 65.
67
Id. at 51.
61
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C. The Modern NCAA: Cartel Enforcement of Rules Supporting Economic
Interests as Much as Amateurism
On the heels of the Sanity Code’s failure, the NCAA entered its modern era by reshuffling its management hierarchy and reforming its approach to rules enforcement, two moves that solidified its managerial clout
in the college sports landscape.68 Primarily, in 1953, NCAA members
voted in their annual convention to grant the NCAA Council69 (the Council) power to enforce NCAA-mandated rules other than the extreme measure of expulsion.70 Further, the Council received authority to impose penalties for rule violations without having to wait for the approval of its
members.71 Now able to efficiently levy meaningful and realistic sanctions
that could damage a school’s ability to compete athletically, the NCAA
Council and its newly credible enforcement arm achieved a revolutionary
change: through its ability to both effectively create and enforce rules, it
was in a much improved position to regulate the behavior of its constituent
members.72

68

Id. at 50–51, 65. In terms of management, the NCAA disbanded the Compliance
and Fact-Finding Committees under the Sanity Code, essentially replacing them with a
Membership Committee and a Subcommittee on Infractions, respectively. The Membership Committee, charged with enforcing NCAA academic and amateur standards, would
make rules enforcement recommendations to the Council of the NCAA that presided over
the NCAA. Id. at 50. The NCAA Council would then subject the suggested penalties for
an offending member to a vote of the entire convention. See, e.g., BYERS, supra note 22,
at 59–61.
69
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 50. The NCAA Council functioned as an oversight committee for the association, similar to that of a corporation’s board of directors.
See id. at 50, 70. Today, the NCAA Executive Committee performs this function for the
entire NCAA, while the Division I Board of Directors and the Presidents’ Councils of
Divisions II and III play this role at the individual division level. See NCAA, supra note
4, at 29 fig.4-2. Members of the NCAA Executive Committee, taken from each of the
NCAA’s three divisions, earn appointment to office from members of the aforementioned
Board of Directors and Presidents’ Councils. See NCAA, supra note 4, art. 4.1.3, at 22.
70
These powers included an ability to impose sanctions against offending schools
such as: a ban from post-season play; limits on television appearances; scholarship restrictions; and even the “Death Penalty,” requiring a school to drop the offending sport
for a determined number of seasons. RANDY R. GRANT ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORTS 33 (2008). Today, rules enforcement occurs primarily at the
division level, such that the NCAA Executive Committee, the contemporary equivalent
of the old NCAA Council, is no longer so involved. See NCAA, supra note 4, at 28
fig.4-1.
71
GRANT, supra note 70, at 33.
72
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 50.
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Motivating the move to establish this regulatory power, and influencing member institutions’ willingness to accept it, was a television-fueled
boom in the 1950s of the nationwide demand for college sports.73 With
this boom finding the NCAA and its members as eager as ever74 to get a
share of the “sports business pie,”75 commentators have asserted that the
NCAA turned to cartelization76 as a means to maximize profits flowing
from the considerable revenues that accompanied televised games.77 This
was because cartel behavior, reflected in numerous rules agreements between NCAA members to restrict competition,78 would permit close regulation of inputs and outputs in the college sports market, thereby allowing
simultaneous minimization of costs and maximization of revenues.79
For example, from 1953 to 1984, the NCAA was able to regulate both
the number of televised football games a network could show and the
number of television appearances a team could make during a given season.80 Until the Supreme Court banned that practice in 1984,81 it had not
only made the “price [of televised football games] higher and [their] output lower than they would otherwise be,”82 but it had also protected and
maximized gate receipt revenues by limiting the supply of games that
might otherwise be televised.83 In the eyes of more than a few informed
observers, such efforts to restrict member competition in aid of profit

73

It was concomitant with this boom that “college sports began to tap the revenues
from television exposure.” Id. at 51.
74
Id. at 50.
75
James V. Koch, A Troubled Cartel: The NCAA, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135,
136 (1973) (quoting Marlow W. Cook, United States Senator from Kentucky).
76
See, e.g., Depken & Wilson, supra note 27, at 226. That the NCAA functions, and
has functioned for years, as a cartel is not necessarily a fact to which the NCAA would
readily admit. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 75, at 136 (noting that the NCAA’s stated
commitment to amateurism made no mention of its functioning as a “moderately successful business cartel”). Fleisher notes, however, that “economists generally view the NCAA
as a cartel ... because the NCAA has historically devised rules to restrict output ... and to
restrict competition for inputs.” FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 5.
77
BYERS, supra note 22, at 90 (noting the NCAA’s collection of impressive television
revenues between the 1950s into the 1980s, reaped from football and men’s basketball
contracts in particular); see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 54.
78
See Koch, supra note 75, at 136–37.
79
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 51. Fleisher refers to the production of college
sports as NCAA “output,” and to the students and coaches that produce this output as
“inputs.” See, e.g., id. at 5, 51, 56. For the remainder of this Note, I will do the same.
80
Id. at 52, 58–59.
81
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
82
Id. at 107.
83
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 56.
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maximization and cost minimization demonstrated that the NCAA was
becoming a certifiable business cartel.84
Moreover, despite the Supreme Court’s call in the mid-1980s for the
NCAA to cease regulation of television outputs, the NCAA has not backed
away from its commercially-oriented cartel behavior in recent years.85
Commentators identifying as much have pointed particularly to NCAA
efforts at regulation of two primary inputs of the college sports market:
student-athletes and coaches.86 As opposed to output restrictions, by which
a cartel can increase product prices by limiting supply, input restrictions
function to limit costs, thus permitting profit maximization by cutting
expenses on the front end.87 The NCAA’s use of this practice has increased steadily since its structural reform in 1953, intensified through
early 1970s efforts to: (1) set the maximum price paid for intercollegiate
athletes via scholarship compensation rules, (2) regulate the quantity of
athletes “purchased” in a given year via limitations on scholarship numbers, and (3) regulate the duration and intensity of members’ usage of
athletes with caps on eligibility and practice hours.88 One commentator
noted in 1973 that such efforts were intended to at once suppress members’ input costs and prevent certain members from gaining competitive
advantages over others, the latter function boosting profits by maintaining
consumer interest through the production of closely contested sporting
events.89 Further, it is important to mention that the NCAA persists in
these efforts today.90
Since 1970, the NCAA’s institutionalization of such cost-cutting, input-restriction efforts has been manifest in the physical expansion of the
NCAA Manual.91 A publication of 161 pages in the 1970–1971 school
year, it ballooned to a 1,268-page, three-volume edition by 1998–1999,
much of which involved rules and restrictions regarding the recruitment
and management of college athletes.92 Combining the effects of these rules
with both the NCAA’s unabashed orientation as a revenue-seeking associ84

See, e.g., Koch, supra note 75, at 136.
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 188–89.
86
Id.
87
See, e.g., FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 56, 58, 65.
88
Koch, supra note 75, at 137.
89
Id. at 137.
90
See, e.g., NCAA, supra note 4, art. 15.02.2, 15.5.1, 17.01.1, at 194, 205, 237.
91
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 239; see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at
94 (describing the NCAA manual as a reader’s guide to the cartel rules).
92
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 32, at 239. The 2010–11 NCAA Manual weighs in at a
voluminous 434 pages, approximately half of which concern rules pertaining to studentathletes. See generally NCAA, supra note 4.
85
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ation93 and the critical roles that college athletes play as revenuegenerating inputs,94 it becomes clear that today, at the very least, the
NCAA is a cartel of members colluding to “reduce [input] costs and thereby generate more ‘profit’ for their athletic programs.”95
II. NCAA SCHOLARSHIP RULES: EVIDENCE OF ANTICOMPETITIVE
BEHAVIOR
The history of NCAA athletic scholarships, including the NCAA’s
agreement to impose the one-year rule and per sport limitations, is illustrative of the NCAA’s legacy of anticompetitive behavior,96 and was at the
heart of Agnew’s complaint.97 This becomes particularly apparent upon
examination of NCAA members’ traditional and strategic use of such
scholarship rules to reduce their athletic departments’ costs. Ironically,
however, the granting of athletic scholarships, or “grants-in-aid,” initially
worked more to increase costs for individual schools than to limit them.98
The grant-in-aid concept arose in the 1940s among schools lacking the
facilities and prestige to compete for football recruits with college football’s established powers in the Ivy League and the Big Ten Conference.99
Specifically, if those lower profile, primarily southern,100 schools could
not ride the growing wave of college football’s popularity101 by attracting
athletes based on the schools’ existing merits, then they would do so by
offering recruits a free education.102 By so doing, schools of lower athletic
93

See supra Part I; see also NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES 2004–2009: NCAA
DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 17 tbl.2.1 (2010) [hereinafter “NCAA, REVENUES AND EXPENSES”].
94
See, e.g., FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 92–93 (offering estimates of boosts in
revenue collection that star college athletes such as Patrick Ewing and Bo Jackson provided to their universities).
95
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 189.
96
See, e.g., id.; SPERBER, supra note 30, at 210.
97
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
98
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 68.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 25, at 42.
102
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 68. Byers, a longtime NCAA executive director with
deep Big Ten roots, notes with some apparent bitterness that, “[t]he South wanted to use
the grant-in-aid to plunder the rich resources of white athletes in other parts of the country.” Id. Big Ten schools, meanwhile, though not formally offering grants-in-aid, began
giving black athletes direct payments to play football in the aftermath of World War II.
See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 169. This practice joined the already established “job
plan” program in the Big Ten, by which schools paid athletes for “minimal work ... [and]
phantom jobs.” Id. at 228.
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repute were able to out-compete their better known rivals, thereby enhancing the status of their football programs, and, by consequence, the reputations of the schools themselves.103 Of course, giving out grants-in-aid
meant a hike in input costs for those up-and-coming schools, which were
not only financing athletes’ tuitions but also covering their lodging and
incidental expenses.104 The schools deemed the expense a worthwhile one,
however, as it offered the chance to expand their athletic programs and to
thus acquire “a larger piece of ... [college football’s] economic pie.”105
Despite the attempt of Big Ten schools to eliminate grants-in-aid from
the NCAA through the inclusion of prohibitory terms in the 1948 Sanity
Code,106 the access to big time football that scholarships offered drove
many schools to maintain the practice and to ignore the new rules.107
When the NCAA balked at expelling those scholarship-granting schools in
response to their “revolt,”108 the Sanity Code, without a means of meaningful enforcement, lost its relevance and was soon abandoned.109 By
1952, with nearly every school in major college football, save the Ivy
League, handing out grants-in-aid110 to remain competitive,111 the members of the NCAA’s most ambitious football conferences,112 including
those of the Big Ten, decided to institutionalize the practice.113 As a result,
103

Byers describes in particular the use of this tactic at Michigan State University,
which used athletic scholarships to steer athletes away from the University of Michigan,
and to pull both the football program and the school itself up by the “bootstraps.” See
BYERS, supra note 22, at 41–43.
104
See id. at 68.
105
SPERBER, supra note 52, at 242.
106
See id. at 233.
107
See, e.g., SPERBER, supra note 52, (citing the University of Virginia as an example).
108
Id. at 241.
109
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 68.
110
See SPERBER, supra note 52, at 381.
111
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 69. In addition to the competition motive, Byers
attributes to scholarship proponents the additionally stated motive of reinforcing amateurism in college sports through the elimination of direct cash payments from boosters to
recruits. BYERS, supra note 22, at 72. Given, however, the NCAA’s 1953 invention of the
term “student-athlete” to dissuade courts from characterizing athletes as workers in
response to the recent proliferation of compensation via grants-in-aid, it seems unlikely
that many in the NCAA viewed grants-in-aid as a boon to the NCAA’s stated amateur
ideal. See BYERS, supra note 22, at 69.
112
Despite their role as pioneers in the growth of college sports, members of the Ivy
League rejected the notion of grants-in-aid and slowly began to deemphasize their athletic programs in the face of college sports’ increasing resemblance to professionalism. See
SPERBER, supra note 9, at 271.
113
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 72.
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in 1956 the NCAA took charge of grants-in-aid, standardizing by general
agreement both their substance and the guidelines for their distribution.114
Of particular relevance to a bachelor’s degree-based complaint like
Agnew’s was the NCAA’s adoption, or lack thereof, of “safety proscriptions” regarding issues of scholarship duration and quantity that the
NCAA addressed upon formally accepting grants-in-aid.115 Regarding the
former was a provision for grants-in-aid to last a maximum of four
years.116 In other words, granting institutions were generally at liberty to
offer athletic scholarships from one to four years in duration,117 with a
four-year “no-cut” scholarship as the most competitive package.118 Caps
on total grants-in-aid, meanwhile, both per team and per year, rested within the purview of member conferences, whose rules could be extremely
liberal.119
It did not take long, however, for NCAA members to determine that
closer, more centralized regulation of athletic scholarships would work in
their favor.120 These closer regulations began in earnest in 1973, when the
NCAA eliminated four-year athletic scholarships, mandating that schools
could thereafter only give grants on a one-year, renewable basis.121 The
NCAA explained the move as a response to the actions of athletes who
would accept athletic scholarships, but then refuse to compete.122 Member
schools were uninterested in spending money on athletes in the form of
multi-year scholarships, only to have those athletes quit their teams but
keep the guaranteed education.123 Such reasoning, acknowledged by the
NCAA no less, supports a description of the one-year rule as a collusively
adopted cost-cutting measure intended to maximize degree prices for college athletes.
114

See id. at 72–73.
Id.
116
Id. at 72.
117
Conferences tended to regulate this practice among their member schools, however, and some more tightly than others. For example, the Big Eight Conference might
permit only one-year renewable grants, while the Southwestern Conference would permit
four-year grants. See id. at 76.
118
See id. at 75.
119
The Southeastern Conference, for example, permitted its members forty new football grants each year with an overall total of one hundred twenty-five permissible per
year. See BYERS, supra note 22, at 220.
120
See, e.g., Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235; BYERS, supra note 22, at 226–
27.
121
SPERBER, supra note 30, at 207.
122
Id.
123
Id.
115
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Further supporting a bachelor’s degree-based antitrust argument was
the NCAA’s decision to place an enforced cap on total scholarship numbers in 1976.124 Imposition of this rule meant that by the mid-1970s, a
football team of over one hundred players could carry a maximum of only
ninety-five scholarship athletes, and could dole out only twenty-five new
scholarships to incoming players each year.125 This decision, a response to
financial difficulties faced by NCAA members with swollen athletic department budgets,126 was one of 225 amendments proposed at the 1976
NCAA convention, the “great majority” of which “dealt with cost reduction.”127 In light of this reality, the description of scholarship caps as costreducing, anticompetitive measures to maximize the cost of bachelor’s
degrees gains strength. Moreover, it is of note that although the primary
utility of the grant-in-aid cap was its role in reducing scholarship costs for
NCAA schools, one observer noted soon after the rule’s passage that
schools additionally appreciated its effect of “giv[ing] them the legal and
moral sanction of the NCAA” to make way for new athletes by canceling
the scholarships of those who did not become stars.128 With the overwhelming resemblance of this practice to Agnew’s situation,129 and given
the practice’s origins in NCAA measures to reduce input costs, a claim of
victimization at the hands of collusive NCAA agreements to cut costs
takes on still greater credibility.
III. THE SHERMAN ACT, SECTION I: ANTITRUST OVERVIEW AND THE
ACT’S HISTORY WITH THE NCAA
In order to obtain relief from the courts, however, Agnew’s claim of
NCAA price fixing and anticompetitive collusion must survive less an
124

See Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235.
BYERS, supra note 22, at 226.
126
See Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235; BYERS, supra note 22, at 219–21.
Byers notes, for example, that despite considerable increases in college football attendance and television revenues during the 1960s, this new money “was chasing the 174%
increase in football costs.” Id. at 220.
127
Koch & Leonard, supra note 27, at 235.
128
Id. at 236.
129
When Agnew’s coach left Rice for the University of Tulsa, “the new Rice coach
switched Agnew’s scholarship to a recruit of his own.” See Branch, supra note 10. This
practice, by which coaches refuse to renew an athlete’s scholarship in order to replace
him with another, is known as “running off.” The practice continues to occur with some
regularity, yet the NCAA has done little to prevent it. See, e.g., Seth Davis, New Coaches
Thomas, Calipari Hurting Players in Scholarship Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 24,
2009, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/writers/seth_davis/06/24/hoop
.thoughts/index.html.
125
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application of logical and historical analysis, and more the standards of
antitrust jurisprudence, which have seen courts treat the NCAA somewhat
differently than other would-be Sherman Act violators.130 An overview of
Section I of the Sherman Act (the Act), a synopsis of the Act’s interpretation by federal courts, and an examination of federal courts’ treatment of
the NCAA in the face of previous Section I challenges is therefore necessary.
A. The Sherman Act, Section I: Overview
1. Foundations and Purpose
Although commentators disagree as to Congress’s precise motivation
for the development and passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,131 there
appears to be less dispute that this “legislative watershed[]” was revolutionary in its enabling of government agencies and private parties to enforce
prohibitions against trade restraints and monopolization.132 Functioning to
improve upon the “hazy” dimensions of common law,133 under which
harmful trade restraints and monopolistic acts were unlikely to be challenged as unenforceable, the Act threatened considerable legal consequences for anticompetitive economic behavior,134 and granted courts a
more concrete reference point by which to identify those harmful acts.135
Finally, though the Act’s rather broad language136 initially imposed an
“interpretive challenge” upon courts to determine those “specific forms of
collective and unilateral conduct that pose unacceptable competitive dan130

See, e.g., Nagy, supra note 26, at 332–33.
Theories as to Congress’s goals include: (1) a desire to promote consumer welfare;
(2) an intent to allow small firms, farmers, and other individuals to compete with large
manufacturers; (3) an attempt to prevent unfair redistributions of wealth from consumers
to producers; and (4) an effort to sustain the vitality of democratic institutions. See
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 21–22.
132
Id. at 20, 24.
133
Id. at 21.
134
See id. at 24. Specifically, the Sherman Act grants aggrieved claimants the hefty
award of treble damages and attorneys’ fees. Id. The act provides for criminal punishment of the prohibited activities as well, threatening fines of up to $100 million for corporations and $1 million for individuals, or imprisonment for up to ten years. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (2006).
135
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 24.
136
The prohibitory language of the Sherman Act, Section I (the section with which
Agnew’s complaint is concerned) reads: “Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
131
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gers,”137 courts have met the challenge by establishing practical tests to
identify and punish such activities as cooperative price fixing, boycotts,
and output restrictions.138
In accusing the NCAA and its members of unlawfully agreeing to artificially inflate the price of a bachelor’s degree for scholarship athletes,
Agnew’s complaint implicates Section I of the Sherman Act by describing
this alleged restraint of trade as an exercise in horizontal price fixing.139
Such an action, in which separate, competing entities of a particular market conspire jointly140 to inhibit inter-firm competition by fixing prices,141
involves a collective effort to carry out the improperly restrictive agreements prohibited by Section I.142 This activity is distinct from the unilateral conduct of a single firm or person to establish monopoly power over a
market through wrongful exclusionary means, as prohibited by Section II
of the Sherman Act.143
2. Section I Jurisprudence and the Rule of Reason
In terms of Section I analysis, though, it is important to note that
courts will not deem all restraints of trade illegal.144 This has followed
from the Supreme Court’s 1910 reasoning in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States,145 in which the Court recognized that any contract, “by obligating
one party to another,” must restrain trade to some extent.146 In so deciding,
the Court characterized as unacceptable only those restraints of trade that
are “unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions,”147 a statement
affirming for posterity the importance of understanding a trade restraint’s
effects before drawing any legal conclusions.148 As a result, for a plaintiff
137

GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 23.
See infra Part III.A.2.
139
Complaint at para. 1, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804).
140
See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 224.
141
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106–07 (1984).
142
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 23.
143
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Commentator Christopher Norris points out that
the NCAA cannot be found guilty of a Section II violation, as it is by definition “not a
monopolist, but the result of a group of competitors who have combined to place some
restraints on the [college sports] market.” Christopher B. Norris, Trick Play: Are the
NCAA’s New Division I-A Requirements an Illegal Boycott?, 56 SMU L. REV. 2355,
2364 (2003).
144
See GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 26.
145
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58–62 (1910).
146
See Norris, supra note 143, at 2364.
147
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 58.
148
See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998).
138
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to prevail in most claims under Section I of the Sherman Act today, he or
she must prove at the outset that the accused: “(1) participated in an
agreement that (2) unreasonably restrained trade in the relevant market.”149
Building on Standard Oil was the Supreme Court’s articulation in
1918 of a “rule of reason” in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States.150
In this case, the Court discarded the notion that a certain activity, here a
price fixing effort by parties with power in the relevant market, should be
considered automatically unreasonable and thus “per se” illegal;151 instead, the Court insisted on a more deliberate approach. A “true test of
legality,” it stated, must ask whether the restraint imposed uses regulation
to promote competition, or instead only suppresses and destroys it.152
Upon establishing the rule of reason as a legitimate means for analysis
of restraint of trade issues, the aftermath of Chicago Board of Trade saw
courts left with two relatively workable Section I tests: a “per se rule and
the rule of reason.”153 Today the per se rule applies to those “naked restraint[s] of trade” that courts have deemed unacceptable under any circumstances, on account of their recognized tendency to “always or almost
always ... restrict competition.”154 The rule of reason, on the other hand,
applies to all restraints of trade not considered illegal per se, and requires a
showing that the challenged action has or can have an adverse effect on
competition that is both unjustifiable and substantial.155

149

Id.
See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 174–79.
151
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 177.
152
See Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. The Court went on to note that the test’s
application should involve consideration of the following factors: “facts peculiar to the
business” in question, the condition of the business before and after the restraint’s imposition, and the probable or actual nature of the restraint’s effect. Id. Although this landmark decision provided a foundation for future analysis of restraint of trade claims, it left
in its wake some perplexing questions, such as how to rank the stated factors and on
which party the burden would rest to provide proof regarding those factors. See
GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 176–77.
153
See Law, 134 F.3d at 1016.
154
Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979). Interestingly, courts will
generally declare horizontal price-fixing schemes, such as that in which Agnew has
alleged the NCAA to have engaged, as illegal per se. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984). Courts have, however, permitted the NCAA to
engage in a wide range of horizontal agreements, largely in the name of the NCAA’s
stated commitment to amateurism. See Nagy, supra note 26, at 332–33.
155
See Law, 134 F.3d at 1017.
150
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As suggested by Chicago Board of Trade, however, the rule of reason
analysis becomes complex due to its demand for the consideration of numerous factors.156 Although courts today rely on a fairly standardized,
multi-step test in analyzing restraints of trade under this rule, the process
can become a protracted one.157
Described as a structure cast “in terms of shifting burdens of proof,”158
the test places an initial burden on a plaintiff to show that there has been
an agreement to restrain interstate trade in order to produce significant
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.159 In response to this
burden, a plaintiff must first offer contextual information to help the court
better understand the challenged practice’s negative effect on competition.160 These initial hurdles generally include: (1) a demonstration that the
challenged act was an agreement implicating trade or commerce,161 (2)
identification of the relevant market in which the challenged restraint will
be felt, and (3) the provision of evidence establishing the defendant’s
power over that market.162 Further, whereas the definition of “commercial” in this context is unclear, thus impelling courts to examine the nature
of a challenged act “in light of the totality of the surrounding circumstances,”163 more concrete definitions for “relevant market” and “market
power” do exist. Specifically, a relevant market is one comprising of
products “reasonably interchangeable” with those that a defendant sells164
or buys,165 and which extends over a defined geographic area.166 Market
power, meanwhile, exists with a party’s ability “to alter the interaction of
supply and demand in the market,”167 thus permitting that party “to raise

156

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1019–20.
158
Id. at 1019.
159
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2010 WL 445190, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010) (quoting
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001)).
160
See Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
161
See, e.g., In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144,
1149 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
162
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549–50
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
163
United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 666 (3d Cir. 1993).
164
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
165
Recall that an agreement to restrain trade can exist among cartel members controlling either an output market as sellers or an input market as buyers. See In re NCAA I-A
Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–52.
166
That is, a plaintiff must define the geographic region across which the relevant
market stretches. See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 3:4 (2009).
167
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
157
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prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.”168 It is
of note, however, that where proof of a blatant or “naked” trade restraint
demonstrating clear anticompetitive effects exists, some courts have
shown a willingness to bypass the context-building function of market
analysis altogether.169 Application of this practice, known as a “quick
look” rule of reason analysis, is often appropriate in horizontal price fixing
cases, the understood purpose of which is often to make prices “unresponsive to a competitive marketplace.”170
Regardless of whether a court utilizes a traditional or quick look rule
of reason, a plaintiff must at some point meet his or her burden of showing
the anticompetitive nature of the defendant’s activity.171 When a restraint
of trade is alleged to exist, indicators of anticompetitive elements typically
include prices and outputs unresponsive to consumer preference, thus
leaving prices higher and outputs lower than they would otherwise be.172
A plaintiff may, alternatively, indirectly show the existence of anticompetitive effects by demonstrating the defendant’s overwhelming market
power.173
Provided that the plaintiff survives this first step, the burden then shifts
to the defendant to show the merits of his or her activity by pointing out its
procompetitive elements.174 In other words, the defendant must show that,
on balance, the restraint in question functions to enhance competition.175
Should a court determine the targeted practice’s anticompetitive effects
outweigh its procompetitive virtues, then a finding of an antitrust violation
will result.176

168

Id. at 109 n.38.
See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998).
170
Id. at 1019–20.
171
See HOLMES, supra note 166, § 3:4.
172
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 106–07.
173
Law, 134 F.3d at 1010, 1019.
174
Id. at 1017.
175
Id. at 1021.
176
See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. It is of note
that should a court find the procompetitive qualities of a horizontal agreement to overwhelm its anticompetitive effects, all is not lost for the plaintiff. Rather, a court at this
point will apply the final step of a rule of reason analysis by deciding whether a “less
restrictive alternative” to the complained of practice exists. See Thomas A. Baker III et
al., White v. NCAA: A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75, 93
(2011) (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997)). If a
plaintiff can convince a court of such an alternative, the court will in turn find an antitrust
violation. See id.
169
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B. The Sherman Act and the NCAA: A Two-Sided Relationship
If, as asserted in Part I supra, the NCAA is a cartel seeking to minimize costs and maximize profits by limiting inter-member competition for
inputs,177 then it would seem perfectly reasonable to expect courts’ hostile
treatment of such an apparent antitrust violation.178 Thus, it has been to the
consternation of many commentators179 that federal courts have often
taken the opposite approach, frequently determining that restrictive NCAA
rules regarding its inputs are, in fact, legally acceptable.180 Informing this
seemingly counterintuitive reasoning has been courts’ recognition of the
NCAA’s stated commitment to the preservation of amateurism in college
sports.181 Application of this reasoning has arisen most often in courts’
responses to college athletes’ antitrust attacks on the NCAA’s eligibility
rules, which courts have consistently recognized as procompetitive efforts
to boost the popularity of college sports by preserving its unique amateur
character.182
That said, federal courts have insisted even in rulings favorable to the
NCAA that it is not exempt from antitrust scrutiny,183 and in two cases,
NCAA v. Board of Regents and Law v. NCAA, have found the NCAA in
violation of Section I of the Sherman Act.184 With these cases breaking
177

See, e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 189.
Gellhorn notes that informing the policy behind Section I is an assumption that
“society may lose the benefits from competition if rivals are permitted to join together
and to consolidate their market power.” GELLHORN & KOVACIC, supra note 33, at 156.
179
See generally, e.g., Mitten, supra note 24; Mitten, supra note 28, at 62–63; Nagy,
supra note 26, at 331–35; Chad W. Pekron, The Professional Student-Athlete: Undermining Amateurism as an Antitrust Defense in NCAA Compensation Challenges, 24
HAMLINE L. REV. 24, 28–29 (2000).
180
See, e.g., Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Hennessey
v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
181
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
182
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)
(noting that the amateur character of college football “makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as ... minor league baseball”); Banks, 977 F.2d at 1089 (asserting the NCAA’s “vital role” in preserving college
football’s amateur character, thereby “enabl[ing] a product to be marketed which might
otherwise be unavailable”).
183
See, e.g., Gaines, 746 F. Supp. at 744 (noting that the NCAA, “with its multimillion dollar annual budget, is engaged in a business venture and is not entitled to a total
exemption from antitrust regulation”).
184
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th
Cir. 1998).
178
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from the seeming jurisprudential norm of NCAA antitrust analysis, it is of
interest that both involved not eligibility rules, but rather NCAA-imposed
restrictions on outputs and input costs, respectively.185
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court applied the quick look rule of
reason186 to find an antitrust violation in the NCAA’s practice of restricting both the quantity of college football games televised and the number
of televised games allowed to a given team in a single season.187 In using
the quick look approach, the Court explained that though the NCAA’s
television plan involved horizontal price fixing, which is ordinarily “illegal per se,”188 some rule of reason application was appropriate for an industry like college sports, “in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all.”189 A full blown rule of
reason analysis, meanwhile, including both the precise identification of a
relevant market and an evaluation of market power, was not necessary
because the NCAA’s television plan involved an “agreement not to compete in terms of price or output” that required no industry analysis to demonstrate its anticompetitive character.190 Ultimately, the Court decided that
the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications for the plan did not outweigh its
anticompetitive effects.191 Specifically, the plan both decreased the output
of games to viewers and increased their price for television networks.192
This effect, noted the Court, was in opposition to factual findings regarding demands of the market, and therefore directly violated the Sherman
Act’s procompetitive, consumer-oriented policy.193
Law v. NCAA, decided fourteen years later, relied greatly on the reasoning of Board of Regents in reaching a similar conclusion.194 In particular, upon confronting a Section I complaint regarding the NCAA’s imposition of maximum salary limits on entry-level assistant coaches at Division
I schools, the Tenth Circuit applied the quick look rule of reason to deem

185

See Mitten, supra note 24, at 3.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 109–10.
187
Id. at 118–20.
188
Law, 134 F.3d at 1010, 1017.
189
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.
190
Id. at 109. “The [NCAA’s] plan,” wrote the Court, “is inconsistent with the Sherman Act’s command that price and supply be responsive to consumer preference.... This
naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification even in the
absence of a detailed market analysis.” Id. at 110.
191
Id. at 114.
192
Id. at 107.
193
Id. at 119–20.
194
See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998).
186
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the “restricted-earnings coaches” (REC) Rule195 an anticompetitive, costcutting measure.196 This approach followed from the court’s recognition of
the REC Rule as an effective horizontal price-fixing agreement, as it noted
that “[n]o ‘proof of market power’ is required where the very purpose ... is
to fix prices so as to make them unresponsive to a competitive marketplace.”197 The court then deemed the NCAA’s procompetitive rationales
insufficient to overcome the REC Rule’s anticompetitive nature, pointing
out especially that a horizontal agreement is acceptable only when enhancing competition, rather than merely maintaining the status quo.198 The
court further noted that the motivation of cost savings, apparent here in the
effort to minimize input costs by capping certain coaches’ salaries, could
not qualify under antitrust laws as a defense to anticompetitive effects.199
Though there has been no successful antitrust claim against the NCAA
since Law, the 2008 settlement of White v. NCAA200 suggests additional
support for the notion that courts will not uphold NCAA rules placing
limits on input costs.201 The claim in White, a response to NCAA rules
limiting grant-in-aid compensation to tuition, books, and room and
board,202 described those rules as the product of NCAA collusion to keep
maximum athletic scholarship payments below the actual cost of attending
college.203 Although the NCAA denied any wrongdoing, it nonetheless
agreed to terms of settlement, establishing, among other payments, a $218
million fund to cover the expenses of athletes in need over a period of six
years.204 That the NCAA settled the case is not determinative of how a
federal court would have decided it. At the very least, however, the
NCAA’s decision did seem to be an acknowledgment of a potential finding of antitrust liability.
195

Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1024.
197
Id. at 1020.
198
Id. at 1024.
199
Id. at 1020.
200
See White v. NCAA, Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement, No. CV-06-0999
RGK (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 28, 2008); see also Jack Carey & Andy Gardiner, NCAA
Agrees to $10M Settlement in Antitrust Lawsuit, USA TODAY, Jan. 30, 2008, http://www
.usatoday.com/sports/college/2008-01-29-ncaasettlement_N.htm. For an in-depth look at
the plaintiffs’ claim in White and a step-by-step review of the full blown rule of reason
analysis a court would apply to most student-athlete antitrust claims brought against the
NCAA, see Baker III et al., supra note 176.
201
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 10–11 & nn.37–38, 198; see also Carey
& Gardiner, supra note 200.
202
See Baker III et al., supra note 176, at 76; Carey & Gardiner, supra note 200.
203
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 198.
204
Id.; Carey & Gardiner, supra note 200.
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Given the outcomes of Board of Regents, Law, and White over the
twenty-year span during which they occurred, somewhat of a pattern appeared to have arisen regarding federal courts’ treatment of antitrust accusations against the NCAA. In terms of NCAA rules addressing athlete
eligibility requirements and other amateurism-centric provisions, these
seemed “to be virtually per se legal under the antitrust laws.”205 On the
other hand, where evidence existed of effective agreements among NCAA
members to directly fix prices in college sports’ input or output markets,
the possibility had arisen that courts would find antitrust violations via
application of the quick look rule of reason.206
The ruling in Agnew v. NCAA, however, upon firmly rejecting the
plaintiffs’ claim that NCAA enforcement of the one-year scholarship rule
and per sport scholarship caps constituted an illegal attempt to fix the
prices of bachelor’s degrees, resisted any momentum that Board of Regents, Law, and White might have built in favor of a price fixing claim
against the NCAA.207 That said, in dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint on
the pleadings, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana did not cite concerns for amateurism to explain its ruling.208 The
court instead applied a full blown rule of reason analysis, and determined
in its attendant market analysis that a market for the sale of bachelor’s
degrees could not exist, reasoning that bachelor’s degrees are not bought
and sold, but rather must be earned.209
205

See Mitten, supra note 24, at 5.
Id. at 4; see also In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp.
2d 1144 (W.D. Wash. 2005). In the case of White, the parties settled the matter before the
court could issue a final ruling. See Baker III et al., supra note 176, at 77.
207
See Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744
(S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011).
208
Id.
209
See id. at *27–30. In finding a market for bachelor’s degrees “implausible,” the
court pointed out that “earning a bachelor’s degree requires the student to attend class,
take required courses, and maintain certain grades, among many other things.” Id. at *28.
For the court, however, to suggest that all top tier college athletes “earn” bachelor’s
degrees in the same way that non-athletes do is misleading. The court did not mention,
for example, that athletic departments at Division I universities have made liberal use of
academic fraud—often by finding tutors to complete athletes’ schoolwork for them—to
keep these athletes academically eligible so they can continue to compete. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Jones, UNC NCAA Football Academic Fraud Case Details Released, THE
DAILY TAR HEEL, Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://www.dailytarheel.com/index.php
/article/2011/09/unc_ncaa_football_academic_fraud_case_details_released; Tom Farrey,
Seminoles Helped by “LD” Diagnoses, ESPN.COM (Dec. 18, 2009), http://sports.espn
.go.com/espn/otl/news/story?id=4737281; Doug Lederman, Another Case of Academic
Fraud, INSIDE HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 21, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.insidehighered.com
/news/2010/01/21/gasouthern. Moreover, even where such fraud does not occur, universi206
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In electing to use a full blown rule of reason analysis, the Agnew court
departed from the quick look analyses applied by the Supreme Court and
the Tenth Circuit in Board of Regents and Law respectively.210 Whereas a
quick look would not have demanded definition of a relevant market,211
the court elected instead to follow Seventh Circuit precedent, determining
therefore that an antitrust claim against the NCAA “must allege anticompetitive effects on a discernible market.”212 By not proclaiming amateurism as a bar to a bachelor’s degree-based price fixing claim against the
NCAA, and by instead using the market definition requirement of the full
blown rule of reason analysis to dismiss such a claim, the court in Agnew
set aside the NCAA’s traditional amateurism shield, and thus left open the
possibility of a plaintiff’s victory in a court more amenable to the quick
look approach.
IV. APPLYING SECTION I ANTITRUST ANALYSIS TO A BACHELOR’S
DEGREE-BASED COMPLAINT
In asserting the unlawfulness of NCAA members’ ongoing agreement
to place limitations on athletic scholarships, thereby restricting competition in the pricing and availability of bachelor’s degrees for studentathletes, a bachelor’s degree-based complaint places the challenged scholarship rules within the category of output market restrictions upon which
federal courts have looked unfavorably, and could thus induce a court to
find an antitrust violation. Specifically, before a court feeling less bound
by precedent to apply the demanded market analysis of the full blown rule
ties routinely hire tutors to help student-athletes fulfill their academic obligations. See,
e.g., Erin Hartness, UNC to Phase out Undergrads as Tutors for Athletes, WRAL
SPORTSFAN.COM (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.wralsportsfan.com/unc/story/10165186/.
With Division I universities expending so many resources, and in some cases violating
NCAA rules, to ensure their scholarship athletes remain academically eligible for the
duration of their college careers, it seems that in many cases a student athlete’s path to a
bachelor’s degree is less challenging than that of a non-athlete. When scholarship athletes
enter college as illiterate freshmen and graduate several years later, the concept of a
market for bachelor’s degrees begins to seem less implausible. See Farrey, supra.
210
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109–10 (1984); Law
v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1014 (10th Cir. 1998).
211
See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (noting that anticompetitive effect can be established without determination of a relevant market); Chi. Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v.
NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (citing with approval use of a quick look rule of reason that
eschews defining a market).
212
Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at
*13 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011) (quoting Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir.
1992)).
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of reason, the commercially motivated horizontal agreement behind the
challenged rules would allow a court to not only ignore issues of amateurism but also make use of quick look analysis. Upon such an approach, the
challenged rules could well not survive.
A. The Questioned Scholarship Rules Implicate Commercial Interests, Not
Concerns for Amateurism
Recognizing the distinction federal courts have drawn between the
NCAA’s horizontal agreements to promote amateurism and those that
unlawfully fix prices,213 study of the origins of the challenged scholarship
rules shows the agreements creating them to fall squarely in the latter
category. Suggesting as much are both the motives that informed those
rules and the willingness of federal courts to associate financial aid for
college students with “trade or commerce.”214
Whereas the majority of federal courts have described most NCAA
rules as protective of amateurism and thus safe from the commercially
oriented agreements with which the Sherman Act is concerned,215 several
have also accepted the notion that financial assistance to students is a
commercial transaction.216 The court in In re I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation advanced this view, drawing a distinction between NCAA
rules addressing student-athlete eligibility and the rule implementing per
sport scholarship limitations that a bachelor’s degree-based claim could
cite.217 In particular, upon responding to an NCAA motion for judgment
on the pleadings, that court noted the possibility that NCAA rules imposing scholarship restrictions, while certainly not advancing amateurism,
might instead function to unlawfully contain costs, and could thereby
become vulnerable to Sherman Act scrutiny.218 With federal court
precedent thus seemingly in favor of viewing NCAA scholarship restrictions as commercially oriented,219 examination of the historical motives
for those restrictions provides further support for their commercial nature.
213

See discussion supra Part III.B.
In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1149
(W.D. Wash. 2005).
215
See, e.g., Banks, 977 F.2d 1081; Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990); Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975).
216
See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993).
217
In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
218
Id.
219
It is of note that in dismissing Agnew’s bachelor’s degree-based claim, the district
court in Agnew v. NCAA made reference to the shield of amateurism that has often protected the NCAA from antitrust challenges, but at no point stated that this shield would
214
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With respect to the one-year rule, persuasive evidence for the primacy
of financial motives informing scholarship restrictions follows from the
difficult circumstances that arose after the NCAA’s 1956 institutionalization of athletic scholarships.220 Although the NCAA at that time permitted
schools to grant their athletes four-year scholarships, certain athletic conferences only permitted affiliated members to offer one-year renewable
scholarships.221 This disparity threatened a “talent drain” of the most capable athletes from one-year scholarship schools.222 The result was concern among several big-time football programs during the 1960s and
1970s that a loss in talent would mean a decrease in their “escalating rewards” for winning provided by an “ever-rising flood of television money.”223 The NCAA’s response was permissive legislation intended to assuage those influential schools’ commercially-inspired concerns.224 Of
particular relevance, as discussed in Part II supra, was the agreement of
NCAA members to permit the granting of all athletic scholarships on only
a one-year renewable basis.225 Whether the motive for this rule was, as
evidence suggests, to protect the NCAA’s valuable college football product by placing its powerhouses on a more equal footing, or, by the
NCAA’s account, to prevent athletes from accepting four-year grants only
to quit their sport at the school’s expense,226 there appears little doubt that
the one-year rule was a commercially informed measure, not one intended
to safeguard amateurism and serve the interests of student-athletes.
Recalling the origins of per sport scholarship caps demonstrates similarly commercial motivations.227 The idea originated during the 1975
“Economy Convention,”228 the purpose of which was to address the increasingly unmanageable athletics budgets of the NCAA’s most athletically competitive schools. With a need to cut costs in order to “save money
for the colleges,” and in an effort to “spread player talent” among Division
I football programs,229 the NCAA sought again to limit input spending by
dictating a hard cap of scholarship players that a given team could carry in
apply to the contested scholarship rules. See Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMSMJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98744, at *12, *24–30 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011).
220
See BYERS, supra note 22, at 72–73.
221
See id. at 75–76.
222
Id. at 75.
223
Id. at 76.
224
Id.
225
See SPERBER, supra note 30, at 207.
226
Id. at 207.
227
See discussion supra Part II.
228
BYERS, supra note 22, at 225.
229
Id. at 228.
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a given sport.230 In this way, the per sport scholarship caps join the oneyear rule as NCAA regulations instituted for the purpose of reducing
members’ costs in producing college sports. Because these rules have thus
functioned as a means to fix production costs rather than to preserve amateurism,231 a plaintiff characterizing those rules as commercially inspired
products of an illegal horizontal agreement would likely be able to avoid
the shield of amateurism that has deflected so many prior antitrust challenges of NCAA behavior.
B. Passing the Rule of Reason Test
As discussed in Part III.B supra, however, mere evidence of NCAA
price-fixing activity in the output market of bachelor’s degrees for college
athletes is not sufficient to demonstrate an antitrust violation. The Supreme Court asserted in Board of Regents that where an industry requires
at least some horizontal restraints on competition to make its product
available at all, it would be unreasonable to deem an NCAA price-fixing
agreement illegal per se.232 In response to complaints regarding NCAA
horizontal price-fixing efforts, courts have instead used the rule of reason
to decide upon allegations of Sherman Act violations.233
1. Appropriateness of Quick Look versus Full Blown Analysis
Assuming a court’s use of the rule of reason to evaluate a bachelor’s
degree-based claim, it would need to decide whether to apply a quick look
or a full-blown analysis.234 As seen in Agnew,235 the latter would force a
plaintiff to demonstrate both a relevant market and the NCAA’s market
power regarding production of athletic scholarships.236 The former would
allow him to instead rely only on a demonstrably effective effort by the
NCAA to so nakedly fix the prices of bachelor’s degrees for studentathletes as to make them unresponsive to a competitive marketplace.237
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See supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 188–89.
232
See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 186–89, 195 and accompanying text.
234
See supra notes 189–90 and accompanying text.
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See Agnew v. NCAA, No. 1:11-cv-0293-JMS-MJD, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
98744, at *24–30 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 1, 2011).
236
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998). The court in Law wrote
specifically that:
231

2012]

NCAA SCHOLARSHIP RESTRICTIONS

235

In Agnew, the court cited the importance of adherence to Seventh Circuit precedent in deciding to apply a full blown rule of reason analysis.238
It is certainly conceivable, however, that a court beyond the constraints of
Seventh Circuit precedent would apply the quick look analysis to a claim
similar to that of Agnew’s: that is, by its promulgation of the one-year rule
and per sport scholarship caps via horizontal agreement, the NCAA and its
members have fixed the price of bachelor’s degrees for student athletes at
artificially high levels.239 Supporting the quick look approach on one hand
would be its use in a case like Law, in which the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit found the “obvious anticompetitive effects” of an alleged
NCAA price fixing scheme to warrant quick look analysis.240 Further
supporting the quick look tack are the anticompetitive origins of the oneyear rule and per sport scholarship caps, measures intended to restrain
NCAA members’ competition for student-athletes by limiting both the
quantity and duration of athletic scholarships.241
2. Anticompetitive Effects
Upon review of student-athletes’ access to bachelor’s degrees via
scholarship before the imposition of the one-year and per sport rules, the
“obvious anticompetitive effects”242 following enforcement of those rules
become more apparent.243 The discussions in Parts II and IV.A, supra,
explain that before institution of the scholarship restrictions, schools had
significant latitude in terms of the duration and quantity of the scholarships they offered.244 This meant that the price and supply of bachelor’s
Under a quick look rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect is established, even without a determination of the relevant market, where
the plaintiff shows that a horizontal agreement to fix prices exists, that
the agreement is effective, and that the price set by such an agreement
is more favorable to the defendant than would have resulted from the
operation of market forces.
Id.
238

See Agnew, 2011 U.S. Dist. at *12–13.
See Complaint at para. 1, Agnew v. NCAA (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-4804).
240
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
241
See discussion infra Part VI.B.2–3.
242
Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
243
Article 19 of the NCAA Manual includes eight pages devoted to “enforcement” of
rules violations. See NCAA, supra note 4, art. 19.01, at 319. Penalties, which range in
severity, generally serve to hinder a school’s ability to compete athletically in the violating sport, and in some cases limit a school’s access to television and other NCAAarranged revenues. See id. art. 19.5.1–19.5.2, at 322–24.
244
See supra notes 110–19 and accompanying text.
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degrees for student-athletes, accessed via athletic scholarships, were responsive to competitive conditions and consumer demand.245 For example,
schools attracting athletes with four-year scholarships tended to outcompete those that did not offer four-year scholarships for the best incoming talent.246 Meanwhile, prospective student-athletes reliably followed the
lines of scholarship supply, as liberal rules pertaining to per sport scholarship limits allowed schools to take on the expense of massive numbers of
scholarship players in any one year, thus facilitating the rapid construction
of competitive teams.247 In other words, access to bachelor’s degrees via
athletic scholarships was considerable, and prospective college athletes
could browse the market for the most competitive offers.
With NCAA members looking to cut input costs,248 their institution of
the challenged scholarship rules in the 1970s saw student-consumers lose
this freedom. Today, NCAA schools, bound by the scholarship restrictions
to which they horizontally agreed, can no longer meaningfully compete
for athletes via the market for bachelor’s degrees.249 This has left athletes
unable to find opportunities for more than one year of guaranteed or discounted tuition.250
A court’s decision to apply a quick look rule of reason follows from a
plaintiff’s establishment of such obvious anticompetitive effects, those
which are apparent when an effective horizontal agreement has made a
product’s price less favorable to a plaintiff than it would have been from
the operation of free market forces.251 Indeed, investigation into the rela245

See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 110 (1984) (noting
the Sherman Act’s command that price and supply be responsive to consumer preference).
246
See discussion supra note 118 and accompanying text.
247
Byers points out, for example, the immediate success of the University of Pittsburgh’s football team in the mid-1970s, when the head coach brought on eighty-three
new scholarship players in just one year, and from that group developed a nucleus that
rose to dominance over the next four years. BYERS, supra note 22, at 228.
248
See supra notes 228–31 and accompanying text.
249
See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 3, at 191–94 (noting the evident function of
NCAA scholarship rules to restrain inter-school competition for student-athletes via
differentiation in scholarship offers).
250
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tive price of bachelor’s degrees before and after imposition of the
NCAA’s scholarship restrictions, as well as inspection of the motives
behind those restrictions, would help persuade a court that anticompetitive
effects plague the scholarship athlete’s bachelor’s degree market. Where,
for example, liberal scholarship rules once saw universities compete with
one another to promise student-athletes tuition sufficient to last them
through four years of college, a span of time sufficient to earn an undergraduate degree, those same universities have since agreed to no longer
compete in that manner.252 This has meant that on a yearly basis, athletes
like Agnew risk losing the compensation they need to help them earn their
degrees. Given these contrasting responses to consumer preference between pre- and post-scholarship restriction eras, a court could fairly decide
that the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s one-year and per sport
scholarship rules are sufficient to justify a quick look rule of reason analysis.
3. Procompetitive Justifications
As indicated in Part III.A supra, a court, upon finding such obvious
anticompetitive effects as to adopt the quick look approach to rule of reason analysis, would proceed directly to an evaluation of the scholarship
rules’ potential procompetitive effects.253 With a court able to find obvious
anticompetitive effects in this case, the burden would shift to the NCAA to
show a procompetitive rationale for the challenged scholarship rules, leaving a court to determine whether the NCAA’s proffered evidence could
sufficiently demonstrate that the scholarship restrictions enhance competition.254 At this point, if Board of Regents and Law—and more recently In
re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litigation—are any indication,
the NCAA would likely turn to its standby procompetitive defense of
“competitive balance.”255 As it did in the aforementioned cases, the
NCAA would argue that its challenged horizontal agreement, here the
close regulation of the duration and quantity of athletic scholarships, ensures that schools with more resources cannot out-compete those of fewer
means.256 This much is necessary, the NCAA has legitimately argued,
252
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because it “must be able to ensure some competitive equity between
member institutions in order to produce a marketable product.”257
Although it is noteworthy that the courts in both Board of Regents and
Law found the NCAA to have offered no evidence whatsoever of support
for “competitive equity” by its price-fixing schemes,258 it is of greater
relevance that observations from the last forty years show the NCAA’s
scholarship restrictions, along with other similar horizontal agreements, to
have more likely hurt than helped competitive balance in college sports.259
Beginning with the institution of athletic scholarship caps and the one-year
rule in the 1970s, restrictions on athletic scholarships immediately prevented ambitious coaches from accumulating talent in their football programs through sheer numbers.260 That is, with coaches no longer able to
dole out as many scholarships as desired in a given year, thereby creating
a massive pool of freshman talent from which the very best could be retained,261 “catching up with ... traditional winners” possessing other “builtin recruiting advantages” became considerably more difficult.262 By the
time of the 1984 Board of Regents decision, the Supreme Court noted,
although without referring specifically to scholarship rules, that the
NCAA’s attempts to restrict inter-member competition in aid of encouraging parity had been “strikingly unsuccessful,” as evinced by the emergence of a “power elite” in high level college football.263
Further, more recent evidence has pointed to similar conclusions. For
example, observations have suggested that the NCAA’s revenue-sharing
efforts—those intended to distribute athletically generated revenues from
257
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the most successful schools to their weaker counterparts—have evolved to
appease its strongest members by limiting the funds they must share.264
The NCAA’s acceptance of this imbalance between haves and have-nots,
it is asserted, has arisen largely to “prevent the defection” of its most competitive and best-supported institutions.265
A closer look at college football, the sport that generates the greatest
revenues for the NCAA’s most competitive members,266 does further
damage to the NCAA’s potential procompetitive argument. In a study of
NCAA attempts through 2001 to encourage “competitive balance” in
college football by institutional change and rule promulgation, Professors
Craig Depken and Dennis Wilson found that these changes most often
came at the behest of influential “pressure groups,” the NCAA’s strongest
athletic institutions, whose true intent was to increase the success of their
programs at the expense of weaker members.267 The result of these initiatives, as suggested by statistical analysis, was the reduction of competitive
balance in the NCAA’s most competitive football division,268 known today as the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).269 Seemingly consistent with
that study’s conclusion is the list of FBS championship teams since the
introduction of scholarship limitations in 1973.270 Of the twenty-two FBS
programs to have earned a championship since 1973,271 sixteen appeared
on Forbes.com’s list of college football’s twenty “most valuable teams” of
2009.272 Further, a focus on more recent championship teams shows that
of the fifteen FBS programs to have won at least one of the twenty championships since 1992,273 thirteen appeared on the Forbes list. Although this
seeming correlation between monetary value and consistent success is far
from an airtight test for establishing the failure of scholarship regulations
to ensure competitive balance in college football, that this relationship
exists at all casts further doubt upon the NCAA’s ability to assert procompetitive results from those regulations. Instead, as much as ever, the Su264
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preme Court’s 1984 observation in Board of Regents of the dominance of
a college football “power elite”274 rings true.
In contradiction to its own assertions,275 the NCAA’s attempts to enhance competitive balance via horizontal agreements among its members,
whether by scholarship regulations or otherwise, appear to have consistently failed. In light of this evidence, it seems unlikely that a court hearing a bachelor’s degree-based complaint citing the anticompetitive effects
of scholarship restrictions would identify any procompetitive effects arising from the NCAA’s one-year and per sport scholarship rules. Rather,
with an accumulation of surface-level information suggesting no improvement in competitive balance within top-level college football, the
NCAA sport involving more scholarship athletes than any other, the
NCAA’s scholarship restrictions appear more and more likely to be little
beyond their characterization in Agnew’s complaint: regulations functioning to maximize the price of a bachelor’s degree for college athletes, thereby serving the revenue building ends of the institutions offering them.
CONCLUSION
Mindful of the district court’s assertive dismissal of the plaintiffs’
complaint in Agnew v. NCAA,276 this Note recognizes that a Section I
Sherman Act claim alleging illegal price fixing of bachelor’s degrees by
the NCAA invites a steep uphill battle. In particular, the Agnew court is
persuasive in its conclusion that a market for the sale of bachelor’s degrees
cannot exist for scholarship athletes, this based on reasoning that even a
guaranteed four-year scholarship would not ensure a student-athlete a
degree.277 Further, the Agnew opinion is only the most recent in a grisly
history of failed student-initiated antitrust suits against the NCAA dating
back to the 1970s.278
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In the face of these obstacles, however, this Note concludes that Agnew has left future plaintiffs enough wiggle room to cite the price fixing of
bachelor’s degrees in asserting that the NCAA’s one-year and per sport
scholarship rules constitute an antitrust violation. First, Agnew was the
latest in a recent line of cases to undertake rule of reason analysis in confronting an antitrust suit against the NCAA.279 This approach suggests that
in such a case, the NCAA’s traditional defense of upholding amateurism280 does not apply. Moreover, with the quick look rule of reason affording plaintiffs a way to avoid the troublesome market analysis stage of the
full blown rule of reason,281 a plaintiff able to convince a court to apply a
quick look rule of reason could well find himself in the favorable position
of forcing the NCAA to demonstrate the unlikely procompetitive effects of
the scholarship restrictions.282
That said, the path to persuade a court to adopt the quick look rule of
reason could be rocky. The Agnew opinion offers no endorsement of its
use, and a plaintiff would face the burden of demonstrating sufficient
anticompetitive harm imposed by the targeted scholarship restrictions
upon student-athletes seeking bachelor’s degrees.283 As this Note mentions, however, the commercially driven circumstances surrounding the
inception of those restrictions,284 and the reduction of student freedom in
seeking out the most favorable scholarship offer since the restrictions’
imposition,285 provide support for the notion that the targeted scholarship
restrictions have had an anticompetitive effect sufficient to justify a quick
look analysis.
Ultimately, whether a court would find a Sherman Act violation to follow from a bachelor’s degree-based price fixing claim is far from certain.
This Note would assert, however, that given the circumstances of the for279
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mation of the one-year and per sport scholarship rules, the effects on student-athletes those rules have had, and the reasoning in those court opinions that have eroded the NCAA’s traditional protected status from antitrust scrutiny, the issue is at least in question.
AUTHOR’S NOTE
In October, 2011, the NCAA’s Board of Directors enacted a proposal
to permit Division I schools to offer multi-year scholarships to prospective
student-athletes—a decision effectively undoing the one-year scholarship
rule referenced in this Note.286 At the time of publication of this Note,
however, popular protest among Division I schools had seen the fate of the
new multi-year scholarship legislation left in question.287 Should a 5/8
majority of Division I schools vote to override the new legislation in a
February, 2012 on-line vote, the one-year rule would again take effect, and
multi-year scholarships would remain a relic of the past.288
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